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POST -CONFLICT JUSTICE IN IRAQ 
ZAKIA AFRIN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It was just like another video from the extremists showing live 
beheadings of human beings. Perhaps it may have been a replica of one 
of the episodes of the Roman Empire when crowds enjoyed people being 
eaten alive by beasts in the Coliseum. Instead, the hanging of Saddam 
Hussein, the fallen ruler of Iraq, was an act of a special tribunal and an 
elected government. At 6 a.m. Iraqi time on December 30, 2006, when 
Muslims in many parts of the world were celebrating the most important 
holiday of their faith, Eid ul Fitr,! the Iraqi President was humiliated in 
front of the world and hung. For many, this is the picture of post-conflict 
justice in Iraq. I beg to differ. The final moments of Saddam Hussein 
are in no way representative of an otherwise impressive effort to pursue 
justice in post-conflict Iraq. 
In the endeavor to create democracy based on the notion of a "Rule of 
Law," perhaps the most daunting task of the Transitional Authority (T A)2 
* Adjunct Professor or Law at Golden Gate University School of Law. 
I. Popularly known as Eid, this is the most significant Muslim festival celebrated once a year 
after a month-long fast known as Ramadan. 
2. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Iraqi Governing Council (lGC), Interim 
Government (lG) and Transitional Administration governed Iraq in the capacity of temporary 
23 
1
Afrin: Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008
24 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. XIV 
in Iraq had been the administration of justice. The traditional definition 
of justice, as discussed by Plato,3 can be adapted to a post-conflict 
situation. Paul Van Zyl, the executive secretary of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, solicits a very broad and 
moving definition of justice: 
H ••• beyond focusing purely on the conduct of 
perpetrators, to include the needs of victims and the 
imperative to reform state institutions to ensure that 
human rights abuses does not recur. "4 
This definition contemplates two aspects of justice: 
1. Retributive and restorative justice leading to a peaceful future. s 
2. Repairing and enhancing the judicial system. 
In a post-conflict situation, the second approach is usually given less 
attention.6 The first approach is criticized by many scholars as part of the 
ongoing debate that evolves around the notion whether seeking justice in 
a post-conflict situation is an impediment to peace.7 In the case of Iraq, 
however, the expectation of retributive justice was undisputed among the 
population. At the same time, the role of the occupiers required 
compliance with international obligation to restore law and order, which 
translated into restoring and enhancing the judicial system. Thus, in 
post-conflict Iraq, justice meant holding Saddam's government liable for 
its thirty-five years worth of atrocities against Iraqi citizens and 
government from May 2003 to 2006 after a us led occupation force ousted the government of Iraq 
and form the UN recognized Transitional Authority of Iraq. 
3. In his 'The Republic' Plato discusses the notion of justice through conversation between 
Socrates and his interlocutors. Plato's own arguments may be summarized to mean justice as the task 
of society according to one's natural abilities. Plato, The Republic (360 BC). 
4. For Paul Van Zyl's analysis 0 f the Velasquez Rodriguez Judgment at 4 Iner-Am. Ct. H. R. 
(Ser.C) 1988 defining justice see Paul van Zyl, Unfinished Business: The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission's Contribution to Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in Post-Conflict Justice 
745-46 (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 2002). 
5. Retributive justice seeks to inflict punishment on the offenders for violations of law 
whereas restorative justice puts major emphasis on the harm committed to human relationships and 
aims to achieving social harmony in the aftermath of a conflict. Restorati ve justice may include 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. 
6. As Cherif Bassiouni observed, " major western powers find it more politically congruent to 
their interests to establish ad-hoc post-conflict justice systems which are essentially focused on the 
past and without much regard for justice capacity building of national systems" M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
Post Conflict Justice xvii (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transational Publishers Inc. 2(02). 
7. Neil J Kritz, Progress and Humility: The Ongoing Search for Post-Conflict Justice 
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2(02). 
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reconstructing the judicial system while also introducing the notion of an 
independent jUdiciary. 
In this article, I analyze the TA's approach and initiative regarding 
post-conflict justice in Iraq. Describing the actions of the authority, I 
seek to answer three questions: first, did the statute of the special tribunal 
meet international standards? Second, did the trial of Saddam Hussein 
serve to satisfy the goals of post-conflict justice? Third, did the TA's 
actions associated with reconstructing the justice system comply with its 
mandate under international law? 
II. ESTABLISHING THE 
PROSECUTING SADDAM 
SPECIAL TRmUNAL FOR 
"In the short span of ten years between 1992 and 2002, 
the values of international criminal justice have taken 
hold as an essential component of the international legal 
order. "8 
The world has truly come a long way since the days of the Nuremberg 
Trial,9 the first international criminal tribunal of its kind, criticized for its 
partiality and attitudes towards the victors. The establishment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)\O and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)II in the 1990s 
supported criminal liability for atrocities committed towards citizens by 
their own governments. Further, the tribunals also integrated the rules of 
fair trials, rights of the accused, compensation for the victims, and many 
other progressive features of international legal order. 12 The 
International Criminal Court (ICC) treaty,13 however, elevated 
8. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post Conflict Justice xvi (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transational 
Publishers Inc. 2(02). 
9. For a full overview of the Nuremberg Trials and available documents, please see 
http://nuremberg.law.harvard.edulphp/docs_swi.php?DI=I&text=overview (last viewed on March 
21,2(08). 
10. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (lCTY) was established by 
the UN through SC Res. 827 on May 25 1991 to prosecute the perpetrators of the Yugoslav war in 
1991. For more information on the Court see International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, http://www.un.orglicty/. 
II. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established by the UN through SC 
Res.955 of November 8, 1994 to prosecute the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. For 
more information on the Court, see International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, hup:/l69.94.l1.53/. 
12. For example, both the ICTY and ICTR provide broad definitions of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, rape and other sexual assaults. 
13. The International Criminal Court, a permanent tribunal to prosecute genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression was created by an international treaty in 
2002. Independent of the UN, the current member of this court is 104. For more information on the 
Court see International Criminal Court, hup:/lwww.icc-cpi.intl . 
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international criminal law to a new, higher standard when it came into 
existence in 2002. Heralded as the flrst gender-sensitive legislationl4 in 
international law, the ICC has strengthened the concept of international 
responsibility for domestic affairs of governments. This trend continues 
today with several tribunals set up to address post-conflict justice 
issues. ls 
In this backdrop, it was only natural that Iraq's fallen government had to 
face a special tribunal kind of justice for the killings of its own citizens.16 
The flrst issue before the Transitional Authority was choosing a proper 
forum. Among the choices were an ICTY -type international tribunal, an 
East Timor-type combination of national and international tribunal, and 
an Iraqi tribunal created solely for the purposes of trying international 
crimes without any international influence. 
Despite expectations of an international criminal tribunal from the NGO 
communities, the TA favored an Iraqi tribunal. 17 The U.S. administration 
reportedly preferred the local institution so that the Iraqi people would 
feel more in charge of the events. Anything less than the death penalty 
for Saddam would not have likely been acceptable to the people though 
impossible under international standards. IS Tom Parker, the head of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) crimes against humanity unit, 
noted that after verifying the interest level in the different types of 
tribunals, the authorities preferred the idea of a national tribunal. 19 He 
also argued that after a brutal sanctions regime, there was little interest of 
any UN involvement among the people. He failed to answer, however, 
14. For a complete discussion see Zakia Afrin and Amy Schwartz, A human rights instrument 
that works for women: The ICC as a tool for gender justice,(Wilson, Sengupta and Evans Edited 
Defending our dreams: Global feminists voices for a new generation, Zed Books 2005). 
15. Consider the case of Sierra Leone. After a ten year long bloody civil war, the government 
of Sierra Leone in agreement with the UN SC Res.1315 of 2000 set up the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone that combined both international and domestic legal traditions to prosecute serious violation 
of international humanitarian law. See The Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.orgl. 
16. The backdrop of international trend to hold governments responsible in special tribunals 
for violations of international criminal law. 
17. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq Special 
Tribunal, in 38 Cornell Int'I L.J. 328, 328-368 (2005) (detailed discussion on the process of 
choosing to establish an Iraqi tribunal as observed by the author in the capacity of director of 
International Human Rights Law Institute's reconstruction of legal education program funded by the 
US AID in Iraq). 
18. Id. at 344. 
19. Tom Parker, Prosecuting Saddam: The Coalition Provisional Authority and the Evolution 
of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 38 Cornell Int'! L.J. 899, 899-907 (2005) (According to Tom Parker, 
as early as April 2003, OHRTJ began to reach out to Iraqi legal community and local human rights 
groups. By August 2003 report titled 'Iraqi Voices' from International Centre for Transitional Justice 
(ICTJ) and Human Rights Centre (HRC) at University of California at Berkeley, claimed 
overwhelmed support for a national tribunal to try Saddam). 
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why a court set up with the blessings of an occupier would be more 
acceptable than a recognized world institution. 
The proposal for the tribunal initiated from CPA allies and the 
Governing Council. The Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) which carried out the 
infamous trial of Saddam Hussein came into existence as the Iraqi 
Special Tribunal (1ST) on December 10, 2003. The CPA authorized the 
1ST statute (promulgated by the Governing Council) to "try Iraqi 
nationals or residents of Iraq accused of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes or violations of certain Iraqi law."20 In August of 
2005, the national assembly of the Transnational Government revoked 
the 1ST and replaced it with the IHT. Unlike the IHT which drew mostly 
from Iraqi domestic law, the 1ST was set to utilize a combination of 
international and domestic criminal laws. 
Per the ICC treaty, the IHT had jurisdiction over Iraqi cItizens and 
residents accused of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity 
from July 1968 through May 2003.21 The IHT also had jurisdiction over 
various crimes punishable under Iraqi criminal law.22 The inclusion of 
offenses mentioned in the 1958 Iraqi penal code, which lack transparent 
definitions, raised concerns over the potential of abuse for political 
purposes.23 Any trial would have to be regulated by Iraqi criminal 
procedure, which derived its roots from civil legal traditions. According 
to the rules, an investigative judge would collect all the evidence and 
witness testimonies for use in the trial proceedings.24 
There are five judges in the trial chamber who decide on the appearances 
of the witnesses and the questions they answer.25 After being presented 
with the documents collected by the investigative judge, witness 
testimonies, and prosecution and defense arguments, trial judges deliver 
a verdict and a written opinion on the case. The verdict may be appealed 
before the Appeals chamber of the IHT which consist of nine judges, 
20. Coalition Provisional Order Number 48, 
http://www.iraqcoalition.orglregulations/20031210_CPAORD _ 48_IST _and_Append ix_A. pdf. 
21. The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, Article I, II, 12 and 13, 
http://www.iraq-iht.orglenlstaute.html. 
22. [d. at Article 14. 
23. In its October 16,2005 briefing paper on The Former Iraqi Government on Trial, Human 
Rights Watch considers crimes mentioned in Article 14 as 'political offenses and of a breadth and 
vagueness that makes them susceptible to politicized interpretation and application' The Former 
Iraqi Government on Trial, A Human Rights Watch briefing paper, October 16,2005 retrieved from 
http://hrw.orglbackgrounder/mena/iraql005/(Last visited April 16, 2007) 
24. [d. at 3. 
25. The Staute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, Article 4.1, 
http://www.iraq-iht.orglenlstaute.html. 
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including a President of the TribunaJ.26 According to the statute, judges, 
prosecutors, the principle defense lawyer of the accused, and all staff 
members of the IHT must be Iraqi nationals.27 Non-Iraqi international 
law experts may be appointed in an advisory capacity to assist judges and 
prosecutors in matters of international legal issues.28 
The IHT granted an impressive set of rights to the accused, including 
equality before the law, presumption of innocence until proven guilty, 
and a fair trial. Armed with international criminal law elements and 
promise of a fair trial, the IHT was hailed as an exemplary domestic 
institution to try war crimes and similar government entities. The 
Saddam trial generated a great deal of interest among international legal 
experts who waited keenly to witness the advancement of international 
criminal law in a domestic forum. 
III. TRIAL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN 
Saddam Hussein's government was infamous for the systematic killing 
of political dissidents. It is estimated that between 1968 and 2003, the 
Iraqi government was responsible for the murder of 500,000 Iraqis.29 
The first case in front of the Tribunal was the Dujali case, where Saddam 
and other members of his regime were accused of killing 148 Shias in 
Dujali in 1982. Among the most criticized issues of the Saddam trial 
were legitimacy, fair trial, capital punishment, and execution. 
The legitimacy of the previous 1ST was harshly criticized by Bassiouni, a 
leading expert in the field on international criminal law. Mentioning the 
CPA's illegal invasion of Iraq he stated: 
No norms or precedents exist in international law for an 
occupying power, the legitimacy of which is in doubt, to 
establish an exceptional national criminal tribunal. 30 
Bassiouni predicted that as soon as the tribunal would be repromulgated 
by a national legislative authority, the legitimacy problem would be 
solved. It can be argued that the IHT was indeed promulgated by the 
elected national assembly, thus perfectly legitimate in the legal sense. 
26. Id. at Article 4.2. 
27. Id. at Article 28 and 22.4. 
28. Id. at Article 9.2, 10.9, and 11.7. 
29. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post Conflict Justice in Iraq: All Appraisal of the Iraqi Special 
Tribunal, 38 Cornell Int'l L.I. 330, (2005). 
30. Id. at 359. 
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However, this argument seems problematic as the election of the national 
assembly was administered during a period dominated by the CPA and 
the occupation. In its Appellate Chamber opinion, the IHT tried to 
answer the question of legitimacy, as put forth by the accused, by 
pointing out that the court was created by an elected government that 
garnered the support of 78% of the Iraqi population.3l Nevertheless, the 
tribunal, as an initiative of the transitional government, will most likely 
always have the "legitimacy stigma" attached. 
Another criticism of the court again draws on the issue of sovereignty. 
The visible involvement of the CPA authorities and US officials was 
subsequently met with the argument that the tribunal could not act 
without the United States' influence. Bassiouni argues that the visible 
role of the US was due to the fact that experts from the US Department 
of Justice, who, in March of 2004, arrived to gather evidence to be used 
in the trial and to train the judges and prosecutors of the tribunal, did not 
have adequate knowledge of the Iraqi legal system and the legal culture 
of the region.32 Whatever the reason may have been, the US involvement 
continued until the end of the trial, thereby damaging the perceived 
independence of the court 
Apart from the execution of the death penalty, the Tribunal was criticized 
from two different aspects. First, the retention of the death penalty, 
which contradicted a well-established anti-death penalty rule of 
international law was, at the very least, questionable. Despite CPA's 
dissatisfaction with this choice, the Governing Council and later on the 
Interim administration, insisted on retaining capital punishment 
consistent with the existing Iraqi penal code. Tom Parker also argued 
that such decisions are the prerogative of the sovereign. Though it is 
tempting to believe in the superiority of the sovereign, this argument 
cannot be given weight as it would justify, in the name of sovereignty, all 
state-sanctioned human rights abuses that violate international legal 
standards.33 
Second, according to one view, the death penalty was carried out in 
violation of the Iraqi code of criminal procedure which allows an 
31. Appellate Chamber Opinion of IHT, December 26 2006. An unofficial English translation 
of the opinion, available at, 
http://law.case.edulsaddamtriaVdocumentsl2oo70103_dujail_appellate_chamber_opinion. pdf. 
32. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraqi Special 
Tribunal, 38 Cornell Int'l L.J. 330, 346 (2005). 
33. For example, many states do not ratify International Covenant on Civil and Political Right 
(1976) or Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) 
claiming that it would jeopardize their sovereign right to regulate legal affairs in a country. 
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additional 30 days after the first appeal for the convicted to request a 
correction of errors in judgment. 34 In rebuttal, Professor Scharf pointed 
out that the provision of the tribunal requiring execution within thirty 
days of the Appeals Chamber's decision prevailed over any domestic 
law, as it was a special court independent of the domestic court system.35 
Though both arguments have merits, Professor Scharf s point must 
prevail in this case. 
Besides these scholars, few international legal experts and human rights 
organizations kept a close watch on the Dujali trial. As fierce critics of 
the invasion of Iraq, these entities have sought a greater UN role in 
prosecuting Saddam Hussein, or at least for a court independent of US 
influence.36 Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that the US neither 
followed a transparent process of consulting Iraqis nor assessed Iraqi 
attitudes about justice and accountability.37 Multiple requests from HRW 
and other human rights organizations to comment on the draft statute of 
the Tribunal were turned down. In a report entitled "Iraq: Dujali Trial 
Fundamentally Flawed" released on November 20, 2006, HRW also 
argued that the trial had enough serious procedural and administrative 
flaws to render it unfair and requested overturning the verdict.38 
Calling the trial deeply "flawed and unfair" Amnesty International's 
Middle East and North Mrica Director said: 
34. Professor Kevin Jon Heller argues that according to Paragraph 266 of the Iraqi Code of 
Criminal Procedure "the convicted person ... may request the correction of a legal error in the 
decision issued by the Court of Cassation, provided the request is submitted within 30 days, counted 
from the date a convicted, imprisoned or detained person is notified of the Court of Cassation 
decision" which means that after the Appeals Chamber rejected Saddam' s plea, he had another thirty 
days to ask the court to correct its legal errors. As Rule 66 of the llIT Rules of Evidence and 
Procedure explicitly requires the judgment to be in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
executing Saddam before the lapse of thirty days violated the lliT procedure .. Michael P. Scharf, 
Gregory S. McNeal & Brianne M. Draffin, A Teacher's Guide and Supplement to Saddam on Trial: 
Understanding and Debating the Iraqi High Tribunal (2007). 
35. Professor Michael P. Scharf further mentioned, 'This was an important approach as the 
llIT Statute was written to import the rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and there were many provisions of the Iraqi Criminal Procedural Law of 1971 that 
were not consistent with those rights. The drafters thus intended the provisions of the llIT Statute to 
control.". 
36. Two of the most influential NOO's worldwide, Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch (HRW). 
37. The Former Iraqi Government on Trial, A Human Rights Watch briefmg paper, October 
16,2005 retrieved from http://hrw.orglbackgrounder/menaliraql005/(Lastvisited April 16, 2007) 
38. In the 97 page report, HRW reports procedural flaws in the trial including: 
-Regular failure to disclose key evidence, including exculpatory evidence, to the defense in advance; 
-Violations of the defendants' basic fair trial right to confront witnesses against them; 
-Lapses of judicial demeanor that undermined the apparent impartiality of the presiding judge; and 
-Important gaps in evidence that undermine the persuasiveness of the prosecution case, and put in 
doubt whether all the elements of the crimes charged were established. 
Human Rights Watch, http://hrw.orgienglish/docs/2006/l1nO/iraqI4589.htm. 
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"[Saddam Hussein's] overthrow opened the opportunity 
to restore the basic right [to a fair trial] and, at the 
same time, to ensure, fairly, accountability for the 
crimes of the past. It is an opportunity missed and made 
worse by the imposition of the death penalty. "39 
31 
Amnesty International also voiced concerns about Saddam Hussein being 
denied his right to a defense attorney for the first year of the trial, the 
assassination of three defense lawyers during the trial, the resignation of 
a judge on grounds of partiality, and overall political interference by the 
US throughout the proceedings.40 
The llIT promised a fair trial for the accused. As a state party to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights41, the notion of a fair 
trial entails a handful of rights to Iraqis, including the right to an 
impartial tribunal and adequate time for the preparation of a defense.42 
The worldwide media reported throughout the trial about the murders of 
the defense lawyers, boycott of the trial by lawyers, and open 
proclamations of the judges about the guilt of the accused well before the 
verdict was delivered. The mode of execution, where Saddam Hussein 
was seen being executed and taunted by executioners, was an 
unprecedented event in the history of criminal justice and further 
strengthened the claim of an unfair process of the Dujali trial. 
Apart from the above instances, in theory the tribunal met international 
standards for holding a fair trial.43 The Dujali trial had a public hearing 
by an allegedly independent tribunal where Saddam Hussein exercised 
the right to retain defense counsel and call witnesses. Saddam Hussein 
was found gUilty after all the evidence was considered and witnesses 
testified against him. His punishment was also consistent with the 
tribunal rules as well as the common practice of the country. The fact 
that Saddam Hussein was brought to trial without being arbitrarily 
detained or executed is in itself a triumph for the notion of the rule of law 
39. Amnesty Intnernal, Amnesty International deplores death sentences in Saddam Hussein 
trial, http://news.arnnesty.orglindexlENGMDEI40372006 (Nov. 5 2006). 
40. See note 38, supra. 
41. Iraq is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (lCCPR) G.A. 
res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. N6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 
171, entered into!orce Mar. 23,1976. Complete text can be found at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/htmVmenu3/b/a3cpr.htm. 
42. The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, Article 14(1) (3)(a)-(g), 
http://www.iraq-iht.orglenlstaute.htrnl#. 
43. According to the UDHR (Article 10, 11), ICCPR (Article 14, 15) and ECHR (Article 6), 
the basic components of a fair trial include a fair and public hearing in an independent tribunal, 
presumption of innocence, and right to defense counsel. 
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in Iraq. The handling of the trial may have been unsatisfactory pursuant 
to today's human rights standards, but it cann~t be simply labeled as an 
unfair trial. 
IV. REPAIRING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
"The effective reconstruction of the justice sector 
requires a coherent approach that places equal 
emphasis on all its elements: police, prosecution, 
judiciary, and the correctional system. "44 
This statement, describing the reconstruction of East Timor and Kosovo, 
communicates the huge responsibility that the T A faced in Iraq. During 
political negotiations in a post-conflict environment, regular criminal 
activities do not necessarily cease. In the case of Iraq, there has been a 
significant escalation of looting, vandalizing, robbery, etc. The risk of 
losing valuable documents of the government or proof of abuses of the 
previous administration had also been high. A working criminal justice 
system was thus a priority from any point of view. 
One of the pillars of the criminal justice system is policing. In the 
beginning of the occupation, the coalition forces began policing for the 
courts without knowing anything about the Iraqi legal system. Among 
their obstacles was the lack of Arabic language skill, which prevented 
them from collecting any information from the arrested individuals.45 
Also the procedural differences made it almost impossible for the CPA to 
administer policing functions properly. As one of the members of the 
Judicial Reconstruction Assistance Team (JRAT) , a team created for 
assisting the CPA with the reconstruction of criminal courts in Baghdad, 
commented: 
As far as the criminal justice system in Iraq, in March 
2003 we knew it was supposed to run according to a 
civil law system based upon a French model codified by 
the Iraqi Penal code of 1969 and that criminal 
procedure was pursuant to the Criminal Procedure 
Code of 1972. What we did not know was how these laws 
were in fact followed."46 To remedy many such 
functional problems, the CPA went about introducing 
44. Hansjorg Strohmeyer. Col/apse and Reconstruction of Judicial System: The United 
Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor 95 Am. I. InCI L. 46. 48-93 (2001). 
45. Captain Travis Hall. From Autocracy to Democracy: The Effon to Establish Market 
Democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan. 33 Ga. I. InCI & Compo L. 157. 157-169 (2004). 
46. [d. at 159. 
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changes in the system. Several political offenses were 
suspended together with numerous procedural 
changes'l7. Lack of expertise in few staff members were 
tackled by a three-tier approach in UNTAET. Mandatory 
week long training prior to appointments, ongoing 
trainings and monitoring through an international team 
of experts.48 
33 
The challenges of reconstructing a judicial system in a conflict-ruined 
country are also limitless. A similar scenario is found in testimony from 
an East Timorese reconstruction team: 
UNTAET staff members will never be able to forget the 
panorama of devastation that awaited them upon their 
arrival in East Timor: most public and many private 
buildings ruined and smoldering in the midst of what 
had once been towns and Villages, now all but 
abandoned by their former inhabitants, cut off from 
transport and communication, and lacking a 
governmental superstructure.49 
One of the first priorities of that mission was to appoint judges and 
prosecutors who are free from conflicts of interest. The reconstruction 
team consisted of three East Timorese and two international experts and 
was led by an East Timorese of high moral standards. The Transitional 
Judicial Service Commission appointed candidates with the requisite 
expertise and political acceptance among the people.50 In the absence of 
a working broadcasting system, the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNT AET)51 staff distributed leaflets 
throughout the territory to invite applications from the citizenry. 
47. CPA Order 7 of 9 June 2003 suspended many political offenses as well as capital 
punishment while Memo no 3 amended the code of Criminal Procedure to allow rights to accused 
previously unavailable under Iraqi law. For example, the right against self incrimination, the right to 
remain silent, the right to be represented by an attorney and others were introduced to the Iraqi legal 
system. See CPAlORD/9 June 2003/07 and CPAlMEMI27 June 2004/03. 
http://www.iraqcoaJition.org/regulations/index.html#Regulations. 
48. See note 43, supra at 55-56. 
49. [d. at 50. 
50. [d. at 53. 
51. United Nation Transitional Administration in East Timor was established on 25 October 
1999 to administer the territory, exercise legislative and executive authority during the transition 
period. It was succeeded by United Nations Mission of Support of East Timor 22 May 2002 after 
East Timor became an independent state. Complete description available at 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/etimor.htm. 
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The Iraqi reconstruction approach, on the other hand, turned out to be 
very different from any other similar cases of reconstruction. The 
differences in attitude may have been the result of an unclear mandate. 
Led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer ill, the CPA was created with the 
primary responsibility of reconstruction of Iraq. "The lack of an 
authoritative and unambiguous statement about how this organization 
was established"52 was never resolved. The mandate was to exercise 
powers of government temporarily during the transitional period. This 
included restoring conditions of stability and security, creating 
conditions for the Iraqi people to be able to determine their political 
future through restoration, and establishment of national and local 
institutions for representative government and facilitation of economic 
recovery, sustainable reconstruction, and development.53 In its 
promulgated 12 regulations, 54 100 orders, 17 memoranda and 13 public 
notices, the CPA exercised its authority as vested through the SC, 
sometimes going outside the sphere of its mandate. The true identity of 
such an institution may seem less important than its mission under the 
circumstances, but its long running effect is undeniable. Lack of a 
founding institution may have allowed the CPA officials, more 
specifically the Administrator, to evade accountability and face possible 
consequences for the mismanagement of issues.55 
Sharing his experience as CPA senior advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of 
Justice, John C. Williamson drew a comparison between the mandate 
under the United Nations Mission In Kosovo(UNMIK)56 and the Iraq 
transitional authority. 57 In the case of UNMIK's justice agenda, justice 
and police powers were reserved to the United Nations, while 
management and control of the justice system was firmly within the 
control of the international community, much like in UNTAET. In the 
52. L. Elaine Halchin, The coalition Provisional Authority: Origin, Characteristics, and 
Institutional authorities, CRS Report for Congress April 29, 2004 available at 
http://www.fas.orglman/crsIRL32370.pdf. 
53. CPNREGII6 May 2003/01 Section I Para 1. 
54. The official CPA website defines 'Regulations' as instruments that define the institutions 
and authorities of the CPA; 'Orders' as binding instructions or directives to the Iraqi people that 
create penal consequences or have a direct bearing on the way Iraqis are regulated, including 
changes to Iraqi law; 'Memoranda' as expand on Orders or Regulations by creating or adjusting 
procedures applicable to an Order or Regulation; 'Public Notices' as the intentions of the 
Administrator to the public and may require adherence to security measures that have no penal 
consequence or reinforces aspects of existing law that the CPA intends to enforce. 
55. The CPA was accountable to the Department of Defense of the United States. The UN or 
the Iraqi people had no authority over the institution thus no way of evaluating its performance. 
56. United Nations Mission in Kosovo was established on 10 June 1999 to establish an interim 
civil administration in the war-tom province of Kosovo. Complete description available at 
http://www.unmikonline.orglintro.htrn. 
57. Daniel Bodansky, Establishing rule of law in post conflict Iraq: Rebuilding the Justice 
System, 33 Ga. J. Int'!. & Compo L. 119,229-244 (2004). 
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Iraqi situation, the mandate was very unclear and the CPA exercised full 
control over the system, instead of having the planned advisory role, in 
order to fill the power vacuum created by the fleeing of senior 
government officials. 
Under the same ambiguous mandate, the T A went about introducing 
changes in the legal education system of Iraq.58 They identified 
programs including improving the infrastructure of and materials 
available in libraries, changing outdated law school curriculums, 
organizing conferences about recent legal subjects, and introducing 
clinical legal education. Rather than concentrating on the immediate 
need, CPA went about changing the basic structure. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Considering the difficult environment in Iraq and cultural challenges 
faced by the T A at the beginning of its reconstruction effort, it must be 
hailed as a praiseworthy one. Even with its shortcomings and criticisms, 
the IHT can be considered as an important milestone for international 
criminal law. Though Saddam Hussein's trial was not a purely fair one, 
it also met many international standards and, as such, was not an unfair 
trial either. His conviction is likely to serve as a deterrent for many 
abusive governments around the world. International and regional 
experts may have played an important role in the judicial reconstruction 
that was essentially consistent with the mandate. In this context, I would 
like to present the following conclusions. 
A. THE IRAQI TRIBUNAL MET THE lNTERNA TIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTION STANDARD 
With its combination of international criminal law and Iraqi domestic 
procedure, this tribunal may serve as a model for other countries willing 
to deal with past violations of international humanitarian law. However, 
the tribunal still has some improvements to make. Abandoning the 
provision for capital punishment and allowing longer periods for appeal 
are a couple of issues that need to be revisited. Further, while the 
inclusion of international and regional experts added to the legitimacy of 
the court, the inherent problem of legitimacy of this court is precisely 
captured by Adel Safty: 
58. Haider Ala Hamoudi, Toward a Rule of Law Society in Iraq: Introducing Clinical Legal 
Education into Iraqi Law Schools, 23 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 112, 112-136 (2005) (mentions that he 
went to Baghdad as a part of a team of educators sent by De Paul University's International Human 
Rights Law Institute (D-IRLl) to reform and improve legal education). 
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"(The) Iraqi Governing Council has been appointed by 
the occupying power; it has not been elected by the 
people. In this sense, it cannot claim to be competent to 
render justice on behalf of the people of Iraq. Therefore, 
the criminal tribunal set up by the Iraqi Governing 
Council does not meet the test of "independence and 
impartiality. "59 
Whereas this court will have to carry the stigma even after being 
reestablished by the elected assembly for years to come, other countries 
may use the same model as a prerogative of sovereign power. 
B. THE TRIAL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN DEVIATED FROM THE GOAL OF 
POST -CONFLICT JUSTICE 
According to Bassiouni, post-conflict justice includes "how the nation 
responds to the systematic violations of the previous repressive regime, 
how it deals with the regime's victims, and how it transforms yesterday'S 
tragedies into lessons for tomorrow that will enhance future deterrence 
and prevention."60 The need to address the violations of Saddam's 
government was followed by establishing a Tribunal that drew upon 
international criminal legal jurisprudence, but fell victim to the conduct 
of some of the individuals involved. It is unfortunate that despite the 
potential to enhance social reconciliation and promote unity among Iraqi 
citizens, the trial of Saddam Hussein has served as an act of vengeance. 
Completely ignoring reparation for the victims, it only contributed to 
clashes between ethnic groups. Rather than addressing past wrongs, the 
trial created many of its own. Though it satisfied few fair trial 
requirements, the image of Saddam Hussein being taunted at his final 
moments is likely to stay in people's minds as the legacy of the Tribunal. 
The trial failed to satisfy victims of the crimes as there was no initiative 
to address reparation or reconciliation issues. It also failed to offer 
justice to victims of Saddam's other cruel campaigns, as he was executed 
before being held liable for all of his atrocities. 
C. THE ROLE OF THE TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY 
While reconstructing the justice system, the T A acted within its 
authority, as it did not modify any fundamental provisions of law 
previously existing in the country. Though it suspended a few provisions 
59. Danielle Tarin, Prosecuting Saddam and Bungling Transitional Justice in Iraq, 
45 Va. I. Int'I L. 467, 493 (2005). 
60. See note 15, supra at 335. 
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and introduced many new ones, it stayed within the recognized mandate 
by introducing fundamental changes in legal procedures, education, and 
judicial accountability which will ultimately better an independent 
judicial system. 
In the end though, while the T A's efforts should not go unnoticed, 
neutral international assistance, a focused trial, and most of all, waiting 
for a duly elected government to set up the tribunal might have resulted 
in a better process for holding Saddam accountable. Iraq may have 
benefited from community courts or informal dispute settlement forums, 
as they have proved to be successful in many post-conflict 
environments.61 Truth commission and other reconciliation forums for 
victims both before the conflict and during the T A, would have served 
the true purpose of post conflict justice in Iraq. 
61. Jennifer Widner, Courts and Democracy in Post Conflict Transitions: A Social Scientist's 
Perspective on the African Case, 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 64, 64-75 (2001) (a discussion of various African 
cases in which the community courts played positive roles in rebuilding the society). 
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